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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DONALD CHAD NELSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930543-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1990) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was the evidence sufficient for the jury to find that
defendant committed the offense of burglary?
"When appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a jury verdict in a criminal trial, this
[C]ourt 'must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and will interfere only when the evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Morgan, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983)).
"Furthermore, defendant must 'marshal all evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence is

insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.'"

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,

472 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,
1207 (Utah App. 1991)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with burglary of a
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1990), and theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (R.

I).1

A jury convicted defendant burglary and acquitted
defendant of theft (R. 92-3).
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines and fees
(R. 105) .

x

The State originally charged defendant with a third degree
felony theft (R. 7 ) . However, the charge was amended to a class
A misdemeanor after the value of the missing items was
established (R. 7 ) .

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At 1:15 a.m. on January 1, 1993, Denise Robinson left
her apartment at 50 North "D" Street to attend a New Year's Eve
party with a friend (R. 269). She locked the door when she left
(R. 270). She returned to her apartment around 3:00 a.m.,
discovered her door unlocked and her apartment burglarized (R.
270).

She called the police and reported her CD player, worth

$110, stolen (R. 270). Her roommate, Angela Dennis, also
reported her stereo, worth between $50 and $200, stolen (R. 28182).

Ms. Robinson discovered her bathroom window broken open,

leaving enough room for someone to enter her apartment through
the window (R. 271-72) .
The next day, her neighbor Michael Nyer informed her
that he had observed the break-in of her apartment (R. 244-45,
273).

Ms. Robinson called the police a second time and the

police questioned Mr. Nyer (R. 273-74, 287-88).

Based upon his

statements, the police arrested defendant, who lived in the
apartment next to Mr. Nyer and across the hall from Ms. Robinson
(R. 287-88).

Mr. Nyer had known defendant for "perhaps four

months or five" before the break-in (R. 244). He stated that he
had "no question at all that it was [defendant]" he saw (R. 244).
Mr. Nyer stayed at home on New Year's Eve to avoid the
crowds and drinking (R. 232). He went to bed at 1:00 a.m., but
was awakened about a half hour to an hour later by a "crackling,
crunching-type sound" similar to "breaking ice" (R. 232-33).
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The

third time he heard the sound, he got out of bed to investigate
(R. 233).
From his bathroom window he saw defendant on the fire
escape "doing something" with Ms. Robinson's bathroom window (R.
234-35).

The fire escape landing at Ms. Robinson's back door is

easily accessible through an emergency exit door located between
Mr. Nyer's and Ms. Robinson's apartment.

State's Exhibit 1. Mr.

Nyer witnessed the defendant enter Ms. Robinson's back door (R.
235-36).
After returning to bed, Mr. Nyer heard Ms. Robinson's
back door open and again heard the "crunching ice" noise (R.
236).

Mr. Nyer got out of bed a second time and again witnessed

defendant doing something with Ms. Robinson's bathroom window (R.
236) .
Mr. Nyer then went to his front door and looked out the
peephole (R. 236) . While looking out his peephole, he witnessed
defendant exiting Ms. Robinson's front door onto the inside
landing (R. 236-37).

The inside landing was well-lit with two

one hundred watt lightbulbs (R. 238), State's Exhibit 1.
Mr. Nyer returned to his bed a third time, but
continued to hear activity on the fire escape landing and in the
hall (R. 238-39) . When he heard Ms. Robinson's back door open a
third time, he looked out his bathroom window and observed the
Venetian blinds in the victim's bathroom open revealing defendant
inside the bathroom (R. 239) . He had a clear view of the
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defendant when Ms. Robinson's Venetian blinds opened because the
light was on in the bathroom (R. 239).
Mr. Nyer also observed that the bottom half of the
bathroom window did not have any glass remaining in it (R. 240).
Initially, Mr. Nyer thought that the window had merely been
opened, but then observed that perhaps the window "had been
broken out" as it was a "two-sash sliding window that had been
painted shut over the years" (R. 240).
Mr. Nyer returned to his front door's peephole and
observed the defendant leaving Ms. Robinson's apartment by the
front door for the second time (R. 240-41).

Although suspicious,

Mr. Nyer did not immediately report the incident because he knew
Ms. Robinson was in the process of moving, and thought perhaps
defendant was helping her (R. 243) . Mr. Nyer never saw defendant
carrying anything from the apartment (R. 241, 255-56).
Mr. Nyer observed defendant wearing "brand new, fancy,
high-tech, heavy duty" tennis shoes at the time he saw defendant
exiting Ms. Robinson's apartment (R. 252-53).

Defendant admitted

that he had received a pair of similar shoes for Christmas, but
claimed that the shoes had been stolen from his place of
employment on December 26th (R. 306-07).

Mr. Nyer also observed

that defendant was wearing "gray sweat pants" (R. 252).
Defendant's alibi witness testified that defendant was wearing
"[a] faded pair of white-washed blue pants" (R. 299). Defendant
similarly claimed that the night of the burglary he wore "a pair
of stone-white pants" (R. 307).
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When Mr. Nyer discovered that Ms. Robinson's apartment
had been broken into, he informed her that he had seen defendant
in her apartment (R. 244-45).

After Ms. Robinson called the

police, Mr. Nyer explained to them what he had seen the previous
night (R. 245).
Defendant's entire defense rested upon his testimony
and the testimony of his live-in girlfriend, Saundra Renee
Willson.

Willson testified that she and defendant played cards

with friends in her apartment until 11:30 or 11:45 p.m. on the
evening of the burglary (R. 2 95).

She claimed that after the

friends left at 11:45 p.m., both she and the defendant remained
in their apartment until she went to bed at 2:35 p.m. (R. 29697).

The defendant also claimed that he never left his apartment

between midnight and 3:00 a.m. on the night of the burglary (R.
306-06, 308).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to satisfy the marshalling requirement
by ignoring the evidence that supports the jury's guilty verdict.
He merely reargues the evidence he presented which the jury
rejected.

Accordingly, this Court should refuse to address

defendant's claim on appeal. However, should this Court
determine to reach the merits of defendant's challenge, there was
ample evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
Defendant labels his argument "The Court Erred When it
Prevented the Jury From Considering the Charge of Criminal

6

Trespass Instead of Burglary."

Br. of App. at 7. While

defendant did "request the Court to amend Count 1 of the
Information to charge criminal trespass" (R. 317), he did not
request a jury instruction on criminal trespass, nor is there any
record evidence that the trial court considered or ruled on this
issue.

He has, therefore, waived its consideration on appeal.

See Brobera v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) ("When
there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial
court reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake
to consider the issue on appeal").
Moreover, defendant has not provided this Court with
any legal analysis in support of the assertion that the jury
should have considered this issue.

This Court could likewise

refuse to address this issue on that ground.

See State v.

Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant
fails to support this argument by any legal analysis or
authority, we decline to rule on it."); accord State v. Larsen,
828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992) ("A reviewing court is
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.")
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)), aff'd.
State v. Larsen, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993).
Given defendant's failure to either preserve or
adequately brief this issue, the State will address what appears
to be defendant's contention on appeal; that there was
7

insufficient evidence to convict him of burglary.

See Br. of

App. at 7 ("Even when the marshalled facts and inconsistencies
are viewed in a favorable light, the prosecution's case-in-chief
still failed to [sic] the intent required for burglary").
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SATISFY THE MARSHALLING
REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, SHOULD THIS COURT
DETERMINE TO REACH THE MERITS, THE STATE
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO
FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BURGLARY.
Defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient for
the jury to find that he committed the offense of burglary.
of App. at 7.

Br.

However, he challenges that verdict by merely

reciting the evidence that supports his theory of the case.
Br. of App. at 3-6, 7-8.

See

He has, therefore, failed to satisfy

the marshalling requirement and this Court should refuse to
address his claim of error.
A.

Standard of Review

"When appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a jury verdict in a criminal trial, this
[Clourt 'must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and will interfere only when the evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Morgan. 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983)).
Additionally, in order to successfully challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence, "defendant must 'marshal all evidence supporting
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the jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence
is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict.'"

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d

470, 472 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991)); see also State v. Chavez, 840 P.2d
846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah
1993).
B. Defendant Has Not Properly Marshalled the
Evidence
Defendant concedes that the jury correctly determined
that he entered Ms. Robinson's apartment unlawfully.

Br. of App.

at 7, 11, 12. Despite this concession, he asserts that the
evidence is insufficient to support the jury finding that he made
that unlawful entry with the intent to commit a felony.

Br. of

App. 7-11.
In support of his insufficiency argument, defendant
merely reargues the evidence he presented in support of his alibi
theory.

He then compares it to the State's evidence and attempts

to demonstrate that his evidence is more credible.

His entire

argument is that the jury "disregarded his alibi" and that the
evidence he presented was "ignored."

Br. of App. at 7-8.

Obviously, as in every criminal jury trial where the
defendant relies on an alibi theory and is convicted, the jury
chose to believe the evidence presented by the State and not that
argued by the defendant. As the supreme court stated in State v.
Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Utah 1987), "[t]he mere existence of
the contrary evidence does not warrant disturbing the jury's
9

verdict. . . . The jury apparently found the evidence presented
by the State credible."

Accord State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231

(Utah 1980) ("It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses .
")

Defendant's failure to demonstrate the State's
evidence, when properly marshalled, is insufficient to support
the jury's verdict is fatal to his sufficiency claim and this
Court should refuse to consider the merits of defendant's claim
on that ground.

State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App.

1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); Scheel, 823 P.2d
at 473.
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support
Defendant's Conviction for Burglary
Even if this Court determines to address the merits of
defendant's claim, the State presented ample evidence to support
the jury's determination of guilt.

Given defendant's concession

that he entered the victim's apartment unlawfully, Br. of App. at
7, 11, 12, the State will only address the sufficiency of the
evidence as it relates to defendant's intent at the time of that
unlawful entry.
The evidence demonstrated that the victim and victim's
roommate both reported the theft of stereo equipment (R. 270,
282).

Denise Robinson remembered using the equipment the night

of the break-in at about 1:15 a.m. (R. 269-71).

The equipment

was missing when she returned to her apartment at 3:00-3:15 a.m.
(R. 269-70).

During this two hour period, an eyewitness observed
10

defendant inside or entering and exiting the apartment three
different times (R. 235-36, 236-37, 239, 240-41).
In order to convict defendant of burglary, the jury
need only find that defendant possessed the intent to commit a
theft or other felony at the time of his entry into Denise
Robinson's apartment; not that the theft be completed.
Code Ann, § 76-6-202 (1990).
the rule that

See Utah

While defendant correctly states

!t

[t]he unlawful entry into private premises may not

alone support a finding of intent[,]"

Br. of App. at 9 (quoting

State v, Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)), he
ignores the evidence outlined above and that "[ijntent may be
difficult to prove but can be inferred."

State v. Johnson, 771

P.2d 1071, 1072 (Utah 1989),2
Additionally, since 1886, the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that unlawful entry combined with other factors is
sufficient to infer the requisite intent for burglary and the
fact that nothing was stolen, or found missing, is irrelevant to
that determination. See People v. Morton, 11 P. 512, 513 (Utah
1886) ("it would seem impossible to account for the presence of
the appellants at that store that night upon any reasonable
hypothesis other than that they were there to steal. The
conclusion is irresistible."); Roaerson v. Harris, 178 P.2d 397,
399 (Utah 1947) ("The crime of burglary was perpetrated by the
plaintiff's entering the garage with intent to steal. Had he
been interrupted and prevented from taking the car, or, after
entering, had he changed his mind and decided not to take the
automobile, he still would have committed the crime of
burglary,"); State v. Tellav. 324 P.2d 490, 491 (Utah 1958) (even
though nothing found missing in store, "a reasonable inference
from the evidence is that the entry was made for the purpose of
committing larceny or some other felony. Intent is usually
proved by acts and conduct."); State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486,
487 (Utah 1961) ("authorities uniformly affirm that where one
breaks and enters into the dwelling of another in the nighttime,
without the latter's consent, an inference may be drawn that he
did so to commit larceny."); State v. Svddall, 433 P.2d 10, 11
(Utah 1967) (In order to convict of burglary, "[t]he evidence
(continued...)
11

Defendant asserts that the jury's acquittal on the
theft charge means that the jury could not have found the
requisite intent for burglary.

Br. of App. at 10. However, as

the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984):
"'The most that can be said in such cases is
that the verdict shows that either in the
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not
speak their real conclusions, but that does
not show that they were not convinced of the
defendant's guilt. We interpret the
acquittal as no more than their assumption of
a power which they had no right to exercise,
but to which they were disposed through
lenity.'"
Id. (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.
1925)) (in turn quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393
(1932)).

Similarly, the acquittal in this case may have been

2

(...continued)
need not show that a larceny or other felony was in fact
committed on the premises entered, but it is sufficient if the
evidence shows that at the time of the entry the defendants had
the intention to commit the larceny or some other felony.");
State v. Clements, 488 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971) ("The trier of the
facts could hardly have failed to believe that the defendant in
entering the clinic near midnight did so with the intent to
steal."); State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981) ("When
one breaks and enters a building in the nighttime, without
consent, an inference may be drawn that he did so to commit
larceny. The fact that nothing was missing when defendant was
apprehended is no defense to the burglary charge; nor does it
destroy the inference of intent to steal at the time of entry.");
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981) ("the authorities
uniformly agree that where one breaks and enters the dwelling of
another in the nighttime, without the latter's consent, an
inference may be drawn that he did so to commit larceny."); State
v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985) ("Defendant's intent
to commit a theft may be inferred from the circumstances of the
break-in. The fact that nothing was missing when he was
apprehended is no defense to the burglary charge, nor does it
destroy the inference of intent to steal at the time of entry.").
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motivated by any number of reasons.

Those unknown motivations do

not mean there was insufficient evidence to find the intent to
commit theft or another felony beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, as illustrated in note 2, supra, the supreme court
has consistently held that even if a theft is not committed, the
jury may reasonably find the intent needed to commit burglary.
Moreover, the jury's guilty verdict indicates that it
clearly found that defendant possessed the requisite intent for
the commission of either theft or another felony when he
unlawfully entered the victim's apartment.

Defendant's unlawful

entry combined with the smashed bathroom window, the missing
stereo equipment and defendant's failure to explain his presence
inside the apartment provided ample support for the jury's
finding.

The jury correctly found that this intent combined with

the unlawful entry satisfied the elements of burglary.

13

CONCLUSION
Defendant fails to satisfy the marshalling requirement
by merely rearguing the evidence rejected by the jury.

This

Court should therefore refuse to address his claim on appeal.
However, if this Court determines to reach the merits of
defendant's argument, the State presented sufficient evidence to
convict defendant of burglary.

Accordingly, this Court should

affirm defendant's conviction.
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